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Abstract. This paper assesses the learning capabilities of agents in a situation
of collective choice. Each agent is endowed with a private preference concerning
a number of alternative candidates, and participates in an iterated plurality elec-
tion. Agents get rewards depending on the winner of each election, and adjust
their voting strategy using reinforcement learning. By conducting extensive sim-
ulations, we show that our agents are capable of learning how to take decisions at
the level of well-known voting procedures, and that these decisions maintain good
choice-theoretic properties when increasing the number of agents or candidates.
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1 Introduction
In a situation of collective choice, we say that an agent is voting strategically, or that
she is manipulating, when the agent does not submit her sincere view to the voting
system in order to obtain a collective result that she prefers to the one that would be
obtained had she voted sincerely. A classical result in social choice theory showed that
all sensible voting rules are susceptible to strategic voting [6, 16]. In fact, strategic vot-
ing may be exploited to make better decisions in several situations where, for instance,
agents are confronted with a sequence of repeated elections, from where an interesting
compromising candidate can be elected.
The plurality rule, aka. first-past-the-post, selects the alternatives that have been
voted for by the highest number of agents. Its computation is quick and its communi-
cation costs very low, but in view of its simplicity it suffers from numerous problems.
For example, it is possible that the plurality winner would lose in pairwise compari-
son against all other alternatives3. If however the plurality rule is used in an iterative
fashion, staging sequential elections in which at each point in time one of the voters is
allowed to manipulate, then it constitutes an effective tool for selecting an outcome at
equilibrium with good properties [11]. This setting is known as iterative voting, and
several recent papers explored its convergence using different voting rules, and assessed
the quality of the winner [9, 15, 7, 10, 12, 14].
Most works in this field suffer from two main drawbacks. First, agents are highly
myopic in not taking into account the history of their interactions, and in having an
3 See, e.g., [13] for a proof.
horizon for strategic thinking of one single iteration. It creates an artificial asymmetry
between the available knowledge and the strategic behavior. Second, to ensure conver-
gence it is required that agents manipulate one at a time, a property that is difficult to
enforce.
In this paper, we tackle both aspects by studying a concurrent manipulation pro-
cess in which agents have the capability of learning from their past interaction. In our
setting, iterative voting is seen as a repeated game in which voters use reinforcement
learning to cast their ballots. We limit the information available to the learning agents
to only the winner of each iteration step (when classic iterative voting methods require
more information). Our goal is to show that multiagent learning can be a solution in
the context of iterative voting, even when the information available to agents is severly
limited: a learning agent bases her decisions on the history of past interactions, and be-
cause of the learning rate, the choice of the vote is not purely myopic. In addition, in
our model all the learning agents are allowed to change their ballot at the same time.
Such possibility cannot be given to classic iterative voting methods because there may
not be convergence to a single winner [11]. The question we ask in this paper is whether
learning can help making a good collective decision [17]: do we observe convergence,
and is the winner good according to choice-theoretic criteria?
We show experimentally that our learning agents are able to learn how to make
collective decisions under standard measures of decision quality, such as the Condorcet
efficiency and the Borda score. The contribution of this paper is twofold: we show that
iterative learning 1) outdo all iterative voting methods using less information, and 2) is
comparable to a well-known procedure called single transferable vote.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic definitions and re-
views the literature on iterative voting and multiagent reinforcement learning. Section 3
presents the specifics of our simulation setting, and Section 4 discusses the obtained
results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Basic Definitions and Related Works
We now provide all definitions that are needed for the construction of our setting. We
introduce the basics of iterative voting and of multiagent reinforcement learning.
2.1 Voting Rules
Let C be a finite set of m candidates or alternatives and N be a finite set of n agents.
Based on their preferences, individuals in N need to make a decision on which alterna-
tive inC to choose. Agents are typically assumed to have preferences over candidates in
C in the form of a linear order, i.e., a transitive, anti-symmetric and complete binary re-
lation over C. We denote with>i the preference of agent i and withP = (>1, . . . , >n)
the profile listing all individual preferences. Hence, we write b >i a to denote that agent
i prefers candidate b to candidate a. A (non-resolute) voting rule is a function w that as-
sociates with every profileP a non-empty subset of winning candidatesw(P ) ∈ 2C \∅.
The simplest voting rule, and the one involving as little communication as possible
among the agents, is the plurality rule: each agent votes for a single candidate, and the
candidates with the highest number of votes win. The Borda rule is a scoring rule in
which a candidate c is givenm−j points for each voter that is ranking c in j-th position.
The score of a candidate is the sum of her points over all voters. For the Copeland rule,
the score of a candidate c is the number of pairwise comparisons she wins (i.e., contests
between c and another candidate a such that there is a majority of voters preferring c to
a) minus the number of pairwise comparisons she loses. For Borda and Copeland, the
candidates with the highest score win. Finally, Single Transferable Vote (STV) can
be viewed as an iterative process: at the first round the candidate that is ranked first by
the fewest number of voters gets eliminated (ties are broken following a predetermined
order). Votes initially given to the eliminated candidate are then transferred to the candi-
date that comes immediately after in the individual preferences. This process is iterated
until one alternative is ranked first by a majority of voters.
2.2 Iterative Voting
Agents face the choice of submitting their truthful ballot, i.e., a ballot corresponding
to their individual preferences, or to vote strategically. In iterative voting, agents start
from a voting situation: they fill their ballots and a winner is announced. Then, one at a
time, an agent changes her ballot, and a new winner is announced, creating a sequence
of ballot profiles and consequent winners.
Iterative voting is guaranteed to converge for the plurality rule with linear tie-
breaking [11] when agents know the score of each candidate at each round, though
for most other voting rules convergence cannot be guaranteed [9]. Restricted dynamics,
defined by limiting the possible actions available to players, have therefore been studied
to guarantee convergence [15, 7, 12]. In this paper we focus on iterative voting with the
plurality rule and on the following two strategies for individual manipulation:
Best response: at time t, given the plurality score for each candidate c at time t − 1,
the voter computes her best response(s) and votes for one;
3-Pragmatists [15]: at time t, given the top three plurality candidates at time t − 1,
the voter manipulates in favour of her preferred candidate amongst them.
Convergence with 3-pragmatists manipulation is guaranteed by the fact that the set
of 3 most-voted candidates is not changed by every manipulation step, hence each agent
will manipulate the election only once.
Two main critiques have been raised to the setting defined above. First, one agent at
a time can change her ballot and the new winner is announced before another agent can
change her ballot: this sequential aspect is unrealistic but is key to guarantee the con-
vergence of iterative voting. As was already observed by [11], there is no convergence
if individuals are allowed to move at the same time. Second, individuals are highly
myopic, since their strategic horizon only considers one-step forward in the iterative
process and they do not make use of the history of previous manipulations by other
agents when making their next choice.
2.3 Multiagent Learning
Multiagent reinforcement learning has been used both in cooperative domains (where
the set of agents share the same goal) and in non-cooperative ones (where each agent
is trying to optimize its own personal utility). For cooperative domains, the key issue
is that learners obtain a local/personal reward but need to learn a decision that is good
for the society of agents. For example, agents that try to optimise air-traffic [1] care
about individual preferences as well as the global traffic. In this paper, agents are not
concerned about the quality of the outcome for the entire population: each voter would
like one of her favourite candidates to win. We are in a non-cooperative setting similar
to the one of learning in games: the actions are the different ballots and agents have
preferences over the joint actions (i.e. voters have preferences over the candidates).
One key difference is that preferences are typically ordinal in voting whereas they are
cardinal for games (see Section 3.1 describing how we generate cardinal utilities from
ordinal ones).
In this paper, we use a basic multiarmed bandit style reinforcement learning al-
gorithm [18] for testing whether agents can learn to make a collective decision, ex-
perimenting with different exploration strategies (see Section 3 for a detailed descrip-
tion). Many reinforcement learning algorithms have been used for playing normal form
games, e.g. joint-action learning [5], gradient-based algorithms such as IGA-WoLF or
WoLF-PHC [4], to name a few. Since no algorithm can be claimed to be best, we focus
on showing that the most basic learning algorithm is able to perform well. For a similar
reason we also choose that agents will only get to observe the current winner, and no
other information is available to them, such as the score of all candidates (as done in
standard iterative voting).
2.4 Evaluation Criteria
Because there is no consensus on the quality of a collective outcome, we will study the
results on multiple criteria. Given a profile of preferences (>1, . . . , >n), a Condorcet
winner (CW) is a candidate that beats every other candidate in pairwise comparisons.
A CW is not guaranteed to exists, but a first parameter in assessing a voting rule is the
percentage of profiles in which it elects a CW when there exists one:
Condorcet efficiency: the ratio of profiles where a CW is elected out of all profiles
where a CW exists.
Many voting rules are designed to elect a CW whenever it exists, such as the Copeland
rule, which hence have a Condorcet efficiency of 1. Other voting rules, such as plurality,
Borda and STV may elect a candidate that is not a Condorcet winner. Related work
estimates the Condorcet efficiency of plurality and Borda for large electorates using
Monte Carlo simulations [8].
A second parameter that can be used to measure the quality of the winner is the
Borda score itself:
Borda Score: a candidate c is given m − j points for each agent ranking c in j-th
position in her truthful preference
The Borda score provides a good measure of how the rule compromises between top-
ranked candidates and candidates ranked lower in the individual preferences. One in-
terpretation of the Borda score is that it estimates the average rank of candidates, and
the Borda winner is the candidate with the highest average rank over all candidates.
Obviously, the Borda rule is the best rule according to this criterion.When varying the
number of voters or candidates, we measure the ratio between the Borda score of the
elected winner and the maximal Borda score that can be obtained, i.e., if B(c) is the
Borda score of a candidate c then BR(c) = B(c)/maxa∈C(B(a)).
3 Learning and Simulation Setting
We now describe the settings of our simulations. Each simulation is defined by the
parameters m = |C| (the number of candidates), n = |N | (the number of voters), T
as the number of iterations, or repeated elections, the agents dispose to learn. We use
iterative voting with plurality rule and lexicographic tie-breaking. Note that the choice
of the tie-breaking method has been shown to be an important factor in guaranteeing
the convergence of iterative voting rules [9]. We also performed experiments with a
randomised tie-breaking rule, obtaining comparable results.
3.1 Preferences and Utilities
While voting is based on ordinal information, reinforcement learning needs cardinal
utility. Hence the need to translate a preference order >i of agent i into a utility func-
tion ui : C → R. Given an ordering >, let pos(c) be candidate c’s position, where
position 0 is taken by the most preferred candidate, and |C| − 1 by the least preferred.
We considered three possibilities:
Linear utilities: ulini (c) = 1− pos(c)|C|−1 ;
Exponential utilities: uexpi (c) =
1
2pos(c)
;
Logistic utilities: usigi (c) = 1− 1
1+e−k(pos(c)−
|C|−1
2
)
,
The parameter k controls the steepness of the curve in the last definition. These three
different methods represent distinct satisfaction contexts. Linear utilities correspond to
the Borda values, meaning that the satisfaction with a given candidate decreases linearly
following the preference order. Exponential utilities are a more realistic representation,
especially in large domains where alternatives at the top bear more importance than
those at the bottom. They can also be used to simulate partial orders, since the alter-
natives below a certain threshold of utility count as non-ranked. In this case, the voters
have precise choices, and the satisfaction decreases quickly as soon as the winner is not
the preferred candidate. In contrast, logistic utilities decrease slowly in a neighbourhood
of the top preferred candidates.
3.2 Profiles Generation
Our experiments are averaged over 10.000 preference profiles generated using the fol-
lowing two distributions:
Impartial culture assumption (IC): linear orders are drawn uniformly at random.
Urn model with correlation α ∈ [0, 1): The preference order of the first voter is
drawn with uniform probability among all possible linear orders that are present in
an urn. A number of copies of the first drawn preference is then put into the urn
depending on the parameter α (more precisely, m!
( 1α−1)
), and the preference of the
second voter is then drawn. The process is repeated until all n preference orders
have been selected.
The urn model is also known as the Polya-Eggenberger model [3]. The interest of such
scheme is to have some correlation between voters, where some observed preference
is more likely to be observed again. The higher the correlation parameter α the more
likely it is that a Condorcet winner exists, and the less likely it is that a single voter
can change the winner of the plurality rule with a single manipulation. Note that IC is
equivalent to the Urn model with α = 0.
We developed a generator for the urn model that avoids the manipulation of all
permutations over the set of candidates, based on the following intuition. At first the
probability of creating a random preference order is equal to 1, and the list of defined
voters is empty. At each iteration a new preference is generated, either as a copy of a
previous preference, or by generating a random preference. The probability of using
a random preference decreases with the number of preference orders generated. The
method is described in Algorithm 1, the function CreateRandomPreference() returns
a sample from the uniform distribution over all possible linear orders, and CopyPref-
erenceFrom(N) picks a voter uniformly at random from N , returning a copy of her
preferences.
Algorithm 1 Efficient Urn Model Generator (α, C, n)
/* α is correlation, C is the set of candidates, n is the size of the profile */
N ← ∅ // preference profile
β ← 1
α
− 1
for i from 0 to n− 1 do
v ←
{
CreateRandomPreference(), with prob. β
β+|N|
CopyPreferenceFrom(N), otherwise
N ← N ∪ {v}
end for
3.3 Learning Algorithm
Since the voting rule is plurality and only the winner is announced at each iteration, the
learner has to decide, at each iteration, the candidate she will vote for. From the point
of view of each voter, the proposed setting correspond to the well-known multiarmed
bandit problem (MAB), a wide studied case of computational reinforcement learning
(RL). A MAB is equivalent to a Markovian Decision Process (MDP) with a single state
[18, 2].
The learning mechanism must evaluate the utility of each possible action during the
sequence of interactions, only based on the feedback suggested by the reward. In our
case, the reward is the preference value of the elected candidate (the winner) for the
agent. The agent then learns a function Q : C → R+ that estimates the expected utility
of voting for each candidate. Once a voter i has voted for candidate c and knows the
winner w, it can compute its reward r (the elected winner is w and we have r = ui(w)),
and from there, i updates its Q value using the following update rule:
Q(c)← βr + (1− β) ·Q(c).
where α is the learning rate used to control the impact of new information: when β =
0, the new information is not used, when β = 1, only the new information matters.
Initially, we fix β = 0.1.
For controlling the exploration, we have several choices (e.g. using -greedy, soft-
max exploration schemes or UCB [2]). We experimented several mechanisms, and the
one described below obtained the best results. We use a simple implementation of the
“optimism in face of uncertainty” principle for exploration: the voter always picks the
candidate with the highest Q-value. To ensure exploration, the Q-values are initialized
with a copy of the preference values of the agent, and in case of ties the agent prefers
to chose the action that has been tested the least. Thus, a voter is most likely to vote for
candidates she prefers at the beginning. If a different candidate wins the iteration, the
bad reward decreases the Q-value, and the agent has incentives to try other candidates
in the coming iterations.
Both -greedy and softmax algorithms make the agents very explorative at the be-
ginning, and when an agent explores, sub-optimal actions are chosen (even the least
preferred ones), disturbing the learning progress of all the agents. The same happens
with classic version of the optimistic-greedy method, where all the utilities are equally
initialized to the maximal reward possible. The UCB method is also very conservative,
the exploration is made sufficient to guarantee near optimal performance in stationary
MAB problems. As the environment is not stationary (agents are concurrently learning),
exploration is no longer adequate and UCB performs poorly.
4 Simulation Results
We now present the main results, showing that a society of agents provided with very
simple learning capabilities can make a “good” collective decision, comparable to that
taken by well-known voting rules and often better than what standard iterative voting
would recommend. In all results we present next, we use the urn model with α = 0.1
for generating the preferences. With the exception of Section 4.3, all experiments in
this section use exponential utilities, but the results for linear and logistic utilities are
similar and not presented here.
4.1 Learning Dynamics
By considering the result of iterated plurality with learning agents as a voting rule per
se (recall that in our setting iterated plurality is guaranteed to converge), we are able to
evaluate its performance in social-choice-theoretic terms, measuring both its Condorcet
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Fig. 1. Performance of learning agents in terms of Borda score of the winner (9 voters, 7 candi-
dates). The number of profiles which actually have a Condorcet winner is 9359 profiles.
efficiency and the Borda score of the winner at the end of the iteration. In Figures 1
and 2 we plot the progress of the first parameter depending on the number of learning
iterations that is allowed (a similar figure can be obtained for the second parameter). In
order to interpret our findings, we also plot the Condorcet efficiency (CE) and Borda
score of one-round plurality, best-response iterative voting, 3-pragmatists iterative vot-
ing, STV, Copeland and Borda. We present the results in one scenario with a population
of 9 voters and 7 candidates. Utilities of voters are generated using exponential utilities
and the results averaged over 10,000 elections.
First, let us consider the Borda score as evaluation criteria in Figure 1. By design,
the Borda voting rule is best. The averaged rank of the winner over all the elections
is about 1.7. The next best mechanisms are Copeland and STV. All these voting rules
require the knowledge of the complete ordinal preference of the agents. We observe that
iterative voting comes next, either in the standard mechanism or our new mechanism
with learning agent. Note that our learning agents are using less information as they only
know the current winner whereas standard iterative voting uses the plurality score of all
candidates. The level of performance is still quite acceptable (the winners’ averaged
rank is about 1.94). Finally, we observe that our mechanism outperforms one round
plurality and 3-pragmatists.
Now, let us turn to Figure 2 in which we evaluate the performances using Con-
dorcet efficiency. Among the voting rules we consider, only Copeland always elects a
Condorcet winner when it exists. For the other rules, STV performs well, followed by
iterative voting with learning agents. The best results are obtained for a high number of
candidates and low number of voters. Previous work showed that a 10% increase could
be obtained with restricted iterative voting in a similar setting (25 candidates and 10 vot-
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Fig. 2. Performance of learning agents in terms of Condorcet efficiency (9 voters, 7 candidates).
The number of profiles which actually have a Condorcet winner is 7331 profiles.
ers, with preferences generated using the urn model) [7], and comparable figures with
50 voters and 5 alternatives using the impartial culture generation of preferences [15].
With standard iterative voting, only one voter at a time can manipulate, and it will do
so only if it changes the outcome. If the winner c is winning by two votes or more, stan-
dard iterative voting will not be able to elect the Condorcet winner. In our framework,
all voters can manipulate. However, some learners may not notice they have a chance
to improve their utilities (because they voted for cw in the past but cw never won, so
the Q-value for cw is low), others may decide to explore. In addition, voters do not
know whether a Condorcet winner exists. But the improvement we observe shows that
learners manage to coordinate their vote which results in electing a Condorcet winner.
Observe that, while Borda and Copeland are obviously scoring the maximum, re-
spectively, in Borda score and CE, the Borda rule can score worse than iterative learn-
ing in terms of Condorcet efficiency, and a complex voting rule such as STV can score
worse under both parameters (this occurs in simulations performed with 3 voters and
15 candidates). Note that we also conducted the same experiments under the impartial
culture assumption, obtaining similar results. As a last remark, observe that in view of
our initialization the first election is always truthful, i.e. its result coincide with one-
round plurality. This is not the case anymore when using other exploration strategies,
for which we obtained slower but similar learning dynamics.
4.2 Scalability
One drawback of using learning agents is the number of iterations for convergence.
Obviously, it is not reasonable for a human agent to participate in such an iterated
process. In the results presented in this section simulations are run with 500 iterations,
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Fig. 3. Scalability of the performance of iterative voting with learning agents at 500 iterations,
increasing candidates (Condorcet efficiency, 9 voters).
and we show that learners can still perform well. In addition, the number of voters and
the number of candidates are two parameters that, when increased, could significantly
deteriorate the performance of learning agents in iterative voting. Figures 3 and 4 shows
instead that the deterioration is comparable to those voting rules we considered.
When we keep the number of voters fixed and we add more candidates, the Con-
dorcet efficiency decreases at a similar rate as the other voting rules (results are equiva-
lent to the ones of STV, and learning agents perform better than iterative best response
and 3-pragmatist with a similar margin). Typically, in learning in games adding ad-
ditional actions requires more iterations for learning well (and we usually observe a
slight drop in performance). When the number of candidates is high, candidates low
in the ranking will have utilities that are negligible compared to the top candidates.
Therefore, under those circumstances, the loss in Condorcet efficiency is acceptable.
What is perhaps the most interesting result is that the number of voters does not
affect significantly the performance of the learning agents. This is surprising since the
environment is less stationary and the noise level is higher with more agents trying
to learn concurrently. Typically, it is much more difficult to reach convergence with a
high number of voters. On the other hand, with the increasing number of agents, the
likelihood of being pivotal decreases, which may help convergence.
4.3 Social Welfare
The last criteria we want to consider are the measures of the social welfare that aggre-
gate the individual utility. We considered the following two definitions:
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Fig. 4. Scalability of the performance of iterative voting with learning agents at 500 iterations,
increasing voters (Condorcet efficiency, 7 candidates)
Utilitarian social welfare: USW (c) =
∑
i∈N ui(c)
Egalitarian social welfare: ESW (c) = mini∈N ui(c)
Observe that if individual utilities are defined as the Borda score, i.e., giving m − j
points to the individual in j-th position, then the USW of a candidate corresponds to
its Borda score. The Borda score, Borda ratio and Condorcet Efficiency measure the
performance of the voting rules. On the other hand, USW is a measure of efficiency,
often used to study the performance of a (cooperative) multiagent system.
Each learning agent is trying to maximise its private utility function. Using plu-
rality at each round, a majority of agents will be satisfied, so we do not necessarily
expect to maximise USW, but we should observe that a majority of agents improves
their utilities. Indeed, this is what we observed in our simulations, in which initially the
performance of the learning agents is comparable with those of other voting rules but
the USW quickly deteriorates. Remember that the utilities of each candidate (from the
most preferred to the least preferred) are 1, 12 ,
1
4 , etc. If we look at the distribution of
utilities, we have more very high values initially (but less than a majority) and at conver-
gence, we have a majority of middle or high utility values. The overall sum decreases
over time, but more agents are happier. As a proof of this observation we measured the
egalitarian social welfare - the utility of the poorest voter - observing that initially ESW
starts pretty low and raises with the number of iterations. Using that criterion, iterative
voting with learning agents scores third behind the Borda rule and Copeland.
Our method seems to perform poorly in terms of USW, although this should not be
interpreted as a negative result. Note that the second worse voting rule is the Borda rule
for the same reason. We also ran experiments with linear and logistic utilities, observing
an increasing social welfare as measured by the Borda score (recall that USW with
linear utilities is the same as the Borda score).
5 Conclusions and Future Work
Motivated by the emergent works on iterative voting, this paper assesses the learning
capabilities of autonomous agents in making good collective decisions. Voting theory
tells us that agents always have incentives to manipulate. The idea of iterative voting
is then to use a simple voting rule such as plurality, and ask each voter one at a time
whether she wants to change her ballot to obtain a preferred winner in the next round.
In this paper we address two weaknesses of existing models of iterative voting: it
is not realistic that voters change their ballot one at a time, nor is the myopic-agent
assumption that does not allow voters to profit from past interactions. In our model we
allow all agents to change their ballots at the same time if they wish to do so. In or-
der to avoid a completely chaotic process, we use learning agents as a mean to learn
a good compromise. We show that by using a simple learning algorithm with scarce
information (only the winner of the current election is shown to learning agents), the
performance of winning candidates are quite good. We evaluate the winner of the itera-
tive process using extensive simulations both in terms of Borda score and of Condorcet
efficiency against various voting rules, and we show that we obtain reasonable perfor-
mances from around 300 iterations. While this number is of course too large for any
human to use this method, it is manageable for artificial agents.
We leave it for future work to use more sophisticated learning mechanisms for de-
creasing the number of iterations to obtain a reasonable performance, and to explore
settings in which more information is available to the agents. For instance, using the
score of each candidate appears quite reasonable, but has consequences on the learning
space.
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